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14 April 1981

West Europe Report

No. 1733

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SOCIALISTS OF NORTHERN EUROPE MEET IN OSLO, DISCUSS TNF

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 16 Mar 81 p 18

[Article by Aasmund Willersrud: "Positive Signals from Moscow/Washington"]

[Text] "There are new encouraging signals which have come recently both from Washington and Moscow regarding the desire for negotiations concerning nuclear weapons. West European Social Democrats are attaching great importance to expressing our common viewpoints, since this provides an opportunity to influence the policy which the Reagan administration is now evidently about to formulate," said Labor Party Chairman Reiulf Steen after the Social Democratic conference in Oslo this weekend.

It was thus a cautious optimism which was expressed among the Social Democratic leaders from Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Great Britain, Denmark and Norway after the informal talks, which concentrated principally on the possibilities for negotiations between the USA and the Soviet Union regarding tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. "We agree that it is urgently necessary that negotiations begin as quickly as possible in order to prevent a weapons race in Europe," said Netherlands Labor Party Chairman Joop den Uyl.

He emphasized that it is important to send signals both to Moscow and Washington regarding this. The participants also agreed that the negotiations initiative which President Leonid Brezhnev mentioned in his speech before the party congress in Moscow must be considered seriously, and there was satisfaction with the USA's expressed desire to begin arrangements in the NATO context.

Reiulf Steen reported at a press conference after the meeting that the next discussions will take place in Brussels in May. This will take place at the same time as the NATO council of ministers meeting, and the Social Democratic parties evidently see an opportunity here to assert their viewpoints, although Steen denied that there will be any lobbying.

Among the Social Democratic parties which took part in the conference in Oslo there are divided opinons regarding NATO's so-called twofold resolution in the fall of 1979 regarding the modernization of nuclear weapons in Europe and negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Netherlands Social Democratic Party in a resolution has opposed the deployment of new missiles, and a similar resolution will probably be adopted shortly by the party in Belgium. The West German representative at the

meeting, former SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] General Secretary Egon Bahr, said that West Germany will insist on the NATO resolution and believed that many of the proposals for deployment can be modified in the course of negotiations before 1983, when deployment is to begin according to the plan. But it is a well-known fact that within Bahr's party, too, there are powerful groups which oppose the NATO resolution.

The question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Scandinavia, which was an important topic during the informal meeting between Social Democratic leaders in Amsterdam a good two months ago, receded into the background during the talks in Oslo this weekend. Reiulf Steen said that the proposal regarding a treaty-protected zone in Scandinavia can in principle be used as an argument in a negotiation situation for the hastening of arms limitations in Europe. The Central European NATO countries have previously shown moderate interest in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Egon Bahr said in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN that such zones are not a realistic alternative in the broader European context, for one thing because the entire defense structure in Central Europe is based on being able possibly to bring nuclear weapons in in an attack situation. Reiulf Steen said besides that he figures that the Labor Party national congress will give its endorsement to the formulation given to the proposal regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones in Scandinavia.

In connection with developments in El Salvador, the Social Democratic leaders agreed to give full support to a solution based on political negotiations, in which the leftist alliance led by Guillerma Ungo must play a central role.

The meeting between the Social Democratic leaders adopted no resolutions or formal pronouncements, and the informal nature of the talks was stressed. The parties found this form of discussing common interests very fruitful. The Netherlands Party Chairman Joop den Uyl said that the Oslo meeting was an important step forward from the previous meeting in Amsterdam. There one had the feeling of ground breaking work, while in the meantime positive initiatives have come from both Moscow and Washington which have made the situation seem brighter now, said den Uyl. He said also that these informal meetings will continue to be expressions of an initiative from the small NATO countries, although representatives from both Great Britain and West Germany took part in Oslo. They are thinking about inviting representatives from France and Portugal also to the meeting in Brussels in May.

8985
CSO: 3108

IMPROVED FATAC WEAPONS, FACILITIES REVIEWED

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-31 Mar 81 pp 44-45

[Text] Luxeuil--The Tactical Air Force (FATAC) has considerably improved its operational potential in the last few years both by strengthening its equipment and by stiffening the infrastructure on which it is based. Robert Galley, French minister of Defense, came to Luxeuil, on 20 February, to see the results of these efforts. He was also shown for the first time the full-size mockup of the future ASMP medium-range air-to-surface missile that will go in service in 1985.

After a long period in which the Air Force appeared to be more concerned with the condition of its flying equipment than with the equipment of its bases, the problem of stiffening infrastructure, especially the FATAC facilities in the east of France, has received its attention. What was primarily involved was an improvement of anti-aircraft defense and camouflage.

Passive steps were taken: construction of variously oriented small hangars, housing aircraft individually; protection of facilities with revetments forcing an attacker to climb to an altitude at which he becomes more vulnerable, in order to attack at a steeper dive angle; and camouflage of all the facilities by means of paint and nets.

At the same time, anti-aircraft defense was intensified by setting up batteries of twin 20-millimeter guns and Crotale missiles, in addition to the purchase of low-altitude detection radar.

At present, around 50 percent of the program of strengthening passive defenses has been carried out. Its completion is scheduled for 1983-1984. With regard to anti-aircraft defense, the bulk of the program has also been carried out, but, starting in 1985, a short-range missile, the SATCP, will supplement the present systems.

The FATAC has begun, moreover, to receive new equipment and weapons that were displayed at Luxeuil.

It is, first of all, a question of Thomson-CSF Calmar electronic countermeasure jammers as active equipment and Phimat chaff as passive equipment. The jammers are for facilitating penetration and the chaff is for self-defense of aircraft. Alkan grenade launchers for jamming infra-red guided missiles have also gone in service.

Next, it is a question of Matra Beluga dispersal bombs and Brant BAP-100 antirunway systems. Units began to be provided with this equipment in 1980.

The ASMP, given prominence in the Luxeuil display, will arm the Mirage-IV starting in 1985 and then, starting in the following year, the Mirage-2000 penetration aircraft and the Super-Etendard. The mockup displayed under a Mirage-IV made it possible to have a better idea of what this missile will be. It is around 4 meters long and 40 centimeters in diameter. This leads us to assume a weight of from 800 to 900 kilograms. The nuclear charge has a power on the order of 150 kilotons. The range of the missile depends, obviously, on the firing altitude. It will probably be around 100 kilometers at low altitude and might reach 300 kilometers when the missile is launched at high altitude, but, at any rate, the range is limited by the drift of the inertial powerplant. Accuracy decreases as length of flight increases.

About 100 ASMP missiles will probably be scheduled, including 80 for the Mirage-2000 and Super-Etendard aircraft. The total cost of the program has been estimated at some 4 billion francs, including warheads.



The Jaguar-A has a range of 550 kilometers when equipped with four Beluga bombs and two Phimat chaff launchers under the wing and a 1,200-liter ventral fuel tank.



The full-size mockup of the ASMP nuclear missile developed by Aerospatiale.

Co ıtermeasures for the Jaguar aircraft displayed at Casaux, in 1978, at the time of the Hunting Congress, are now operational in formation. Here, is shown the Phimat chaff launcher (under the outer tip) and the CT-51J container housing two Thomson-CSF Calmar jammers. (See AVIATION MAGAZINE No 734, p 29).



Other new weapons for the Jaguar aircraft, the BAP-100 antirunway system (under the belly) and the 100-millimeter Brandt rocket launcher.



The armament of the Mirage-IIIE aircraft of the Tactical Air Force has been improved over the years. Shown here is a jettisonable fuel tank that makes it possible to hang four bombs.

10,042
CSO: 3100

ARMENIANS CLAIM ATTACK ON TURKISH DIPLOMATS

Paris LE FIGARO in French 5 Mar 81 p 32

[Article by Jean-Charles Reix: "The Roots of Armenian Terrorism"]

> [Text] The "Armenian Secret Liberation Army" (ASLA) is not satisfied with claiming credit for the murder of the Turkish Embassy's social adviser in Paris, Resat Morali, who was struck down yesterday about 1300 by two killers, not far from Place de la Bastille. From Beirut, an ASLA spokesman also threatened that his organization "could attack French diplomatic missions and institutions worldwide if France abandons its neutrality." These threats and yesterday's attack, in which another embassy member, Tecelli Ari, was seriously wounded, are definitely in the style of the toughest branch (pro-Palestinian) of Armenian terrorism.

Another Turkish national, a bank manager who was accompanying the two victims, escaped unharmed from the ambush set by two men with 9- and 7.65-mm revolvers at the corner of Amelot and Pasteur-Wagner streets in the 11th arrondissement. Shooting broke out while the victims were in the act of leaving a Turkish Embassy annex at 26 Boulevard Beaumarchais and were heading toward their car parked a little farther away. Mr Ari, already seated behind the steering wheel, was struck first. Mr Morali tried to run away before being cut down by bullets. About 20 shots were fired before the two killers disappeared at a run.

Three assassinated Turkish diplomats stationed in Paris; two other members of the diplomatic staff (a chauffeur and press adviser) slain by Armenian killers; Turkish premises machinegunned or bombed on numerous occasions ... and all within 5 years.

People in high places are beginning to wonder whether France has not become a battleground for the settlement of Turkish-Armenian scores. In any case, a strong Armenian underground structure is finding all the support it needs in France for its terrorist activities. These activities do not just concern Turkish interests. Swiss establishments--banks, tourist agencies, airline companies--have recently been the target of Armenian bombs: Switzerland dared to arrest two persons who had set bombs! And like an endemic phenomenon, every time that French police successfully score reprisals, various explosions echo through Paris in the name of Armenia.

Other European capitals have hardly escaped the repercussions of a 65-year-old conflict. The 4 million persons of Armenian ancestry scattered throughout the world are in fact represented by three political parties and several activist organizations. Their common goal: to show the world that they hold the Turkish Government responsible for the massacre of more than 1 million of their countrymen between 1915 and 1922.

Copernic Street Bomb

Terrorist groups today still refer to those distant tragic events: "the commandos dispensing justice for Armenian genocide" have claimed credit for a series of political murders--assassinations of Turkish ambassadors in Austria and France in 1975, of the representative to the Holy See in 1977, of the wife of the chief of Turkish diplomacy in Spain in 1978.

"Black April" (reference to April 1915, when the events began in former Armenia) is still talked about in Europe. In Marseille in April 1980, for example, some terrorists fired rockets at the Turkish general consulate. The "New Armenian Resistance Movement" strikes particularly in Italy: [illegible] persons wounded in Rome on 10 December 1979 and 13 other persons wounded on [illegible] March 1980 during attacks against Turkish Airlines.

But much more disturbing is this "Armenian Secret Liberation Army" (ASLA), which attacks Turkish property or individuals, as it did yesterday. But for several months it has also been directing its operations--tracts have mentioned this--against people or institutions singled out as symbols of "imperialism and Zionism, which it resembles." This is a significant phrase revealing complicity with certain Palestinian movements, a circumstance which has been confirmed by various antiterrorist services.

It also seems certain that the leaders and henchmen of the ASLA, with headquarters in Beirut, have been organized, trained and equipped by one of the toughest groups in the Middle East. And these fallen soldiers have added a violent analysis of revolutionary Marxism to the Armenian cause.

After each commando operation, the trails followed by investigators have invariably led them to the terrorist training camps of Lebanon, Libya and South Yemen. One of these trails, incidentally, went through Copernic street in Paris. The bomb which exploded there on 3 October, and which killed four people in front of a synagogue, was technically of the same nature as the one discovered in Switzerland on the same day. Two ASLA militants were in the act of handling it in a Geneva hotel room when its detonator went off.

These militants were treated and then jailed. Since that day, a new Armenian movement, appropriately called the "3 October" movement, has continually attacked Swiss interests in Europe. Bombs at Swissair offices, the Swiss Tourist Office and various banks have exploded in Geneva, Bern, London, Paris and Milan. It is estimated that the various "avengers" of former Armenia's inhabitants (3 million of them now live in the Soviet Union, 350,000 in France and 150,000 in Lebanon) have carried out about 200 attacks worldwide since 1975.

11915
CSO: 3100

'ARMENIAN SECRET ARMY ASSASSINS'

Paris LE FIGARO in French 12 Mar 81 p 16

[Photo and caption]

These are composite sketches of the two killers who shot down two Turkish diplomats on Ameiot street in Paris on 4 March. They were made up with the help of the many witnesses to that shooting and a third diplomat who managed to escape. Credit for the attack has been claimed by the Armenian Secret Liberation Army.

11915
CSO: 3100

LETTER SAYS POLISH GROUP BEHIND RADIO FREE EUROPE ATTACK

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 28 Feb 81 p 3

[Report by Claes von Hofsten]

> [Text] In a letter postmarked in Göteborg, three persons who described themselves as an armed secret execution group have assumed responsibility for a bomb attack against Radio Free Europe in Munich last Saturday [21 February].

The letter is written in Polish. The three signatures are illegible. The letter reached the radio station in Munich Friday [27 February].

In the bombing attack late Saturday evening eight persons were injured, three of them seriously. In addition, great material damage was done. The three seriously injured all belonged to the Czechoslovak editorial staff.

The head of the Swedish SÄPO [Security Police], Sven-Åke Hjälmroth, says that it had been known earlier that there are certain Polish groups in Göteborg, but that they had not previously been guilty of any form of violent actions or threatened violence.

"If there is a Polish group behind the bombing, it still will not be altogether simple to find out the political hue of such a group," says Sven Åke Hjälmroth. "We know there a number of Polish groups in Sweden, both for the régime and against it."

The American radio station Radio Free Europe broadcasts programs in some 20 languages that are spoken in East Europe and the Soviet Union. The authorities in those countries regard the radio station as a spy transmitter.

After the Warsaw Pact meeting in December of last year the radio station was accused by the Soviet Union and East Europe of further interference in Poland's internal affairs.

8815
CSO: 3109

BRIEFS

FIRST WATER POWER INSTALLATION--Territorial Administration Chairman Jonathan Motzfeldt foresees that about one half of Greenland's electric power consumption will be covered by water power plants by the turn of the century. The Joint Council on Mineral Resources in Greenland will now request the Territorial Planning Committee of Greenland's Landsting [Parliament] to point out during February the place in South Greenland where the first water power plant is to be built. This was reported by the joint council's chairman, Territorial Administration Chairman Jonathan Motzfeldt, after the council's meeting in Copenhagen. If all goes according to plan, Greenland's first water power plant will be put into operation during 1984. Jonathan Motzfeldt says that if the first water power plant meets expectations, then others will follow and around the year 2000 one half of Greenland's total electric power consumption can be covered by water power plants. The first power plant will cost 70 million to 90 million kroner. As soon as the location has been established, GTO [expansion unknown] will begin developing the concrete project. [Text] [Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 19 Feb 81 p 6] 8985

CSO: 3106

POLL SHOWS SOCIAL DEMOCRATS WOULD LOSE THREE SEATS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Mar 81 p 1

[Text] If elections to the Folketing were held now, the parties supporting the Government would lose six seats, and then would no longer have a majority. These parties just today are beginning negotiations for a new two-year compromise agreement. Today BERLINGSKE TIDENDE is publishing the Gallup political index for March, based on a poll conducted in the period 7-20 March. This gives the Social Democrats a setback of three seats, and the other parties cooperating with them in the present compromise agreement--the Radical Liberals, Center-Democrats and the Christian People's Party--also a loss of three seats. The Conservatives, the Progressive Party, the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialists would register gains.

On the basis of the Gallup Poll, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has prepared a distribution of seats in the Folketing if elections were held now. The two seats for the Faeroes and Greenland have not been taken into account.

	GALLUP	Presently in Folketing
Social Democratic Party	65	68
Radical Liberals	10	10
Conservatives	24	22
Single-Tax Party	5	5
Socialist People's Party	13	11
Center-Democrats	4	6
Christian People's Party	4	5
Liberals	22	22
Left-Socialists	7	6
Progressive Party	21	19

CSO: 3106

NEW MINISTER FOR GREENLAND DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH EC

Godthaab GRØNLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 29 Jan 81 p 17

[Article: "New Minister for Greenland: 'It Is the Joint Council Which Must Discuss Property Rights'"]

[Text] "But today Greenland's subsoil is a common concern," says Tove Lindbo Larsen, who thinks that Greenland's most serious problem is the employment situation and the housing shortage.

Who owns Greenland's subsoil? The Greenlanders or the Danish community?

AG [expansion unknown] posed this question to newly appointed Minister for Greenland Tove Lindbo Larsen the day after she acceded. She reflected and then came the following answer:

"With the knowledge I have today I believe that it is necessary to listen to the statements to come in the 'Joint Council on Mineral Resources in Greenland.' Both the Danish State and the Greenland home government are represented there. This is the route it is necessary to take in order to clarify the question. But as things go today, Greenland's subsoil is a common concern."

A Surprise

Tove Lindbo Larsen, the 52-year-old home economics teacher and longstanding member of Parliament, was one of the surprises in Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen's reorganization of the government last week. She is taking over the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, also, as did her predecessor Jørgen Peder Hansen.

Tove Lindbo Larsen is referred to at Christiansborg as a hard-working and cooperation-oriented person. As a member of Parliament she visited Greenland three times and she has for her nearly six years in Parliament been a member of the House's Greenland Committee, which discusses legislation concerning Greenland.

Pleased that It Was the Ministry for Greenland

Tove Lindbo Larsen said yes to the minister's post when Anker Jørgensen called her. Time to think it over: one minute.

[Question] Why did you say yes?

[Answer] I have always had the attitude that when someone hands me a problem I set to work in solving it if it is within the capabilities I believe I have. I am especially pleased that it was the Ministry for Greenland. After my visits to Greenland I have been absorbed a great deal by the community and the conditions of the Greenland population.

A Ministry in Liquidation

[Question] It was mentioned upon your accession that the Ministry for Greenland is a "ministry in liquidation." When did the ministry disappear in thin air?

[Answer] I prefer the expression "ministry in adaptation" to "ministry in liquidation." It is indeed stated in the Home Government Commission's report that the ministry is to adapt to the development of the Greenland home government. We may expect a gradual scaling down. But I have no idea how many years this will be spread over.

Cooperation--a Dominating Principle

Tove Lindbo Larsen says that a dominating principle for her in the job as minister for Greenland is cooperation, not only within the ministry, but to the greatest extent also with Greenland's politicians and the Greenland people. "A minister can accomplish nothing alone behind a desk," she says. "I will in no way represent a guardianship over Greenland. Decisions will not be made here at the ministry without consultation and collaboration with the parties which are affected."

Tove Lindbo Larsen will visit Greenland as often as it is "reasonable and possible." "I was very pleased with the invitation which Territorial Administration Member Moses Olsen gave me to visit Greenland already during the Landsting's [Parliament's] spring session."

The Biggest Problems

[Question] What are Greenland's biggest problems?

[Answer] I will answer that right off: the employment situation and with that the entire economic area, too. And the housing shortage. I am glad to hear that a housing conference has been planned. A brilliant idea. Here there will be an opportunity to produce a clear analysis of the scope of these problems and with that a basis for discussing how they can be solved.

EC--an Advantage for Greenland

[Question] Will Greenland remain in EC?

[Answer] That must be decided by the people of Greenland. I myself at the time advocated Danish membership in EC, if not with wild enthusiasm. I continue to do so. And with regard to Greenland I believe that EC membership is still an advantage. But, as mentioned, Greenland must decide this itself.

Bloc Subsidy?

[Question] Will the bloc subsidy for the home government be fiddled with in your term as minister?

[Answer] As far as I look upon it there are no plans in that direction. But I can not issue guarantees that this can be avoided. Denmark can come into so serious an economic situation that the bloc subsidy will have to be discussed. I hope not. And in any case this will not happen without negotiations in advance with the home government.

Thus concludes the new minister.

8985
CSO: 3106

STUDENT DISTURBANCES ATTRIBUTED TO POLITICAL PARTIES

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 5 Mar 81 pp 1,5

[Text] After a delay of seven whole years and, in fact, in sight of the pre-electoral period, the New Democracy [ND] government has just now revealed that: The Marxist parties, to which New Democracy itself handed over education, are leading Greece's students "to struggles, to absenteeism from classes" and other similar actions which seriously hinder operation of the schools, while they openly proselytize them to enlist in party organizations which serve nothing other than the aims of PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] and the two KKE's. It seems that this "revelation" of the government occurred just recently and it was announced on 4 March when Deputy Minister of Education Vas. Kondogiannopoulos made related statements and, at the same time, gave for publicity various proclamations of the parties' youth and student organizations. Here, however, the government met with misfortune, given that similar proclamations or even those with a more serious content are published by the hundreds in various party printed matter--ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS has republished some of these for years, denouncing the fact--and they are known to the public which is following the phenomenon with increasing uneasiness.

More specifically, on 4 March, relative to Deputy Education Minister Kondogiannopoulos' circular entitled "schools and politics" and the attack launched in recent days by part of the press and OLME [Federation of Secondary School Teachers], Kondogiannopoulos stated the following to press representatives:

"We did not expect such a quick justification of the circular and such an immediate confirmation of its necessity by events.

"I report to you three of the many examples of systematizing and party infiltration and propaganda from every side which are being undertaken in the schools." (Editor's Note: At this point the deputy education minister gave the press representtives three photocopied proclamations of KNE [Greek Communist Youth], PASOK and PAMK [Panhellenic Militant Student Movement] which exhorted the students to anarchic demonstrations.)

Kondogiannopoulos added: "I would like to ask if financing of the agitation and KKE's passage into the second apportionment are being harmonized with the advice of UNESCO which OLME calls upon for the internationally acceptable aims of the public school.

"We want to ask, moreover, if Greek educators do or do not have an obligation to hinder the schools reaching such a level of wretchedness, if the schools do or do not ignore and stop such efforts which end in instigation of truancies or interruptions of classes? If they do or do not penalize those particular students when the replacement of lost classes is impossible and the students show up at exams with insufficient knowledge, while it is known that the private and model schools have not lost any classes from their programs. And, certainly, they will hasten to characterize these results, saying they are due to the government's class policy. Let every citizen and educator responsibly decide if the circular was necessary which repeats known principles, accepted by all, which must govern the operation of the schools."

V. Kordogiannopoulos also explained that "the circular is trying to protect the students from political propaganda, not police them." He added: "School interests us. We do not police children outside of school. They are free there. But it is not allowable for me as a teacher or professor who believes in PASOK or KKE to mould children with these principles. The schools' program aims at the formation of a free democratic consciousness.

"Twenty-eight October is a holiday against fascism and thus it must be celebrated in the schools. The establishment of the Polytechnic holiday is a holiday against dictatorship. We try through the school programs to mould the students. But we cannot transform children into party organs. We do not want apolitical youths, we want to mould democratic consciousnesses."

The PASOK Proclamation

The PASOK proclamation is as follows:

Panhellenic Socialist Movement. From Thessaloniki Nomarchy Committee to local committees. Subject: student absenteeism on 5 March. Number 357)1981.

Comrades-in arms: The message of change is coming from every corner of the Greek earth. The beginning of the end of the Right has arrived. Let us make its defeat more overwhelming.

We welcome your contribution to this struggle with the 5 March absenteeism and promise you every type of aid.

For its success, cooperate with other progressive elements like KKE, KODISO [Democratic Socialist Party] and KKE Interior. You will procure posters and other material from the nomarchy committee via those responsible in each local committee.

The city office has designated 15,000 drachmas to strengthen the propaganda of every local committee in the area of lyceums related to the 5 March absenteeism. For any urgent financial problem, call 237-244.

A group of students from PASP [Panhellenic Militant Student Faction] and PSK [Pan-Student Trade Union Movement] will participate in the demonstration. At the demonstration, see that slogans against the EEC, NATO and, naturally, the fascist Right are heard. Our information reports that ND has not cast a party line, so the field is free. Good luck. With struggling greetings, G. Mikhalis.

KKE Exterior Proclamation

The proclamation of KNE, the youth of the KKE Exterior, is as follows:

Students: Take part en masse--within KNE lines--in the people's struggle for the Right to lose the parliamentary majority and for democratic change.

Proclamation of the sectional council of Larisa F E students:

Fellow students: Today there are more problems in life and education than at any other time. Analytical programs, shortages of buildings, books and professors, the method of teaching, "mass cuttings" in examinations make our future uncertain, make education a priviledge for the few. The annoying and, many times, unscientific or even useless notions, the now indispensable tutoring school, the prohibition of every essential cultural and athletic activity in school and their scarcity outside of school lessen our free time and "burden" it with anxiety, make many of our fellow students easy plunder in individualism and corruption.

Our struggles for modern and democratic education, for syndicalist freedoms, are confronted with terrorism. For this reason, today we need to strengthen our struggle--within the student communities and along with our working parents and our progressive professors--for an education in the service of the people and the country.

Fellow students: The ruling class and ND have every reason to detest our organization and struggle. For this reason, it offers us the "fairytale" about "our freedom" which supposedly is endangered from the left by the communists.

Lift high--yet again-- the banner of struggle, give the answer which they deserve, fight with KNE: for our rights in education, for the peaceful future of our generation without NATO and headquarters and for the Right to leave power. Strengthen in every way KKE's passage into the second apportionment (17 percent). Unite your power, be organized in KNE.

Sectional Council of KNE Larisa Students.

The PAMK Proclamation

The PAMK proclamation is as follows:

Fellow students: We do not need many words and, particularly, many arguments to be persuaded that the condition of secondary education today is wretched, because we know it very well from first-hand experience. ND's educational policy bountifully offers us: anachronistic, barren and reactionary content of knowledge; shortage of teaching staff; compression of free time; mental anguish from running from school to tutoring school; seclusion from the more general political and social life; terrorism, dismissals and threats of lowered grades; and an anti-democratic framework for functioning of student communities. And surely the crowning glory is the panhellenic examinations in which we are forced to participate on unequal terms and to claim the inalienability for every new right to education.

The latest measure of the Right's anti-educational policy is the forced application of the five-day system which has resulted in overburdened programs for the students.

This is the education of the Right--barriers to schooling, terrorism, imposition of competitiveness and individualism as a way of behavior.

Fellow students: From the common march between the clashing rocks of the anti-educational government policy, we have a deep understanding of how only with a common stance only with our own energetic participation and continual mobilization can we stand as an impediment to the plans of the Right and lay claim to solutions for our problems. It is necessary today for us to re-establish a broad dialogue among us, within broad democratic procedures in which every fellow student can express his opinion.

Let us safeguard the operations of student communities. Let us discuss our problems in every department, in every class, in every school. Let us select the solutions which we must immediately and by struggling lay claim to.

The common, united stand of the students, far from efforts for control and guidance, is the only path for development of the student movement and achievement of targets which are today favorable not only for the students, but also for the other agents of education.

Forward, united for new struggles. The panhellenic examinations must be abolished. Free student syndicalism. The five-day system must function to the students' benefit.

Anti-Authority Students

In the meantime, it was communicated from Salonica that, after the 4 March publications in the Salonica daily press related to the absenteeism proclaimed for today by the so-called general councils of students and the appearance of organizations with the title "anti-authority students" etc., the following was announced by the Ministry of Northern Greece:

"There are no legal councils of students in the school area. There are only student communities by classes or class departments which operate on the basis of a special regulation of the Ministry of Education.

"The organizations 'anti-authority students' etc. are illegal and are turned, according to their statement, against the institution of the school; they proclaim social revolution and they are trying to tempt the students to illegal activities. The whole thing suggests suspicious organizations which serve foreign interests to the students.

"The attention of the students, but also their parents, should be drawn to avoiding any intermingling or participation in such types of demonstrations. The schools are obligated, following the recent circular of the Ministry of Education, to apply the provisions in force and the regulation of the student communities against transgressors."

PASOK Reaction

Late on the night of 4 March, as concerns the distributed proclamation attributed by Deputy Education Minister Kondogiannopoulos to PASOK, the PASOK Press Office announced that it is counterfeit. In the announcement it is reported that this document has been denounced as counterfeit by the Salonica PASOK youth since 27 February 1981.

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GALLEY PROVIDES OVERVIEW OF NATION'S MILITARY POLICY

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 81 pp 9-27

[Speech by Robert Galley, minister of Defense, in the Institute for High Studies of National Defense, 3 February 1981]

[Excerpts] For several months now, you have been hearing a number of lectures delivered by very eminent and competent experts. You are, therefore, an informed audience. Consequently, in preparation for my today's lecture, I set myself a simple objective. I should like this lecture to be useful to you. That is to say, for it to be able to feed and stimulate your reflections and your work.

Because I have been responsible for some weeks now for implementing the defense policy drawn up by the president of the Republic, it seemed interesting to me to turn over to you the reflections inspired in me by an analysis of the evolution of France's international environment since 1974, at which time I held the same responsibilities. That is the first objective of my presentation. Then I should like to tell you how, very concretely, our country is best adjusting its defense effort to this evolution.

I. International Environment*

Let us examine, first of all, the evolution of France's international environment.

The United States and the Soviet Union

First major evolution: development of the military effort of the United States and of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, there is the constant increase in their strategic military foces. On the other hand, there is a continuation of development of their traditional forces.

In the field of strategic nuclear forces, evolution was very fast in the last decade, owing to the tenacious effort of the Soviets to make up for their lag behind the Americans. The SALT I agreement gave the SSR a quantitative advantage to offset their definite technological, therefore qualitative, lag behind the United States. Since then, both countries have continued their effort. But the effort made by the Soviet Union to modernize its forces was considerably greater, as is shown by their progress in the technique of multiple warheads that hey mastered as early as 1973,

* The subtitles are inserted by the editorial staff of DEFENSE NATIONALE.

as we know. At present, they have amply achieved parity and even seem about to acquire shortly a certain degree of superiority in several fields, like the total power of weapons or the capability of striking land missile sites with very great accuracy.

For all that, the balance of terror is still intact. Why?

The superabundance of arsenals of destruction confronting each other is, in fact, such that each protagonist will probably have immense means for striking the adversary, if the latter should decide to attack. Therefore, the capability of mutual destruction is preserved. In the longer term, the implementation of new programs by the United States -- primarily mobile land-based missiles, new generation of sea-launched surface-to-surface missiles, cruise missile installation on strategic bombers -- should substantially strengthen its strategic position. Of course, in the meantime, the Soviet Union will not remain passive and will develop its own forces. All things considered, that is where the impacable logic of the competition by both superpowers is found. Every breakthrough, any progress by one will prompt the other to pursue modernization of its arsenal.

But it is also possible to rest assured that any slowdown in the technological effort of preparation or of quantitative development of the weapons of one of them will probably be regarded by the other only as encouragement to persevere and to increase its superiority definitely. The major uncertainty in the matter concerns only the ability of those two countries to come to an agreement in the future to control evolution of the escalation of their respective arsenals. In this connection, it is well to make one point clear. During these last two decades, America was not the one that lacked moderation.

In the field of traditional means, the ratio of the forces is more complex. Soviet superiority is considerable in the land field. It finds expression both in the number of tanks and artillery pieces and in the number of infantry divisions. The Warsaw Pact forces are subjected to a regular qualitative improvement, especially in the field of preparation for tactical nuclear warfare. Nothing indicates that a change in this trend is to occur in the near future.

Moreover, the Soviet Union has an essential geographic advantage in some zones where it is making a special destabilization effort. It must be noted that, at present, several of the main crisis zones are located on the periphery -- or not far from it -- of the territory of the Soviet Union. In those areas, facilities for intervention by the USSR are superior to those of the United States, owing to this fact.

But, on the other hand, the United States has substantial advantages. Its Air Force is qualitatively very superior to the Soviet Air Force, owing to American technological progress, especially in the field of electronic equipment (very diversifed countermeasures adapted to various threats, multipurpose and multiset onboard radars, highly accurate navigation systems, all with utilization of onboard computers) and in the field of armament (laser, infrared, inertial, electromagnetic guidance).

With regard to the Soviet Navy, although it has become the second largest in the world, it still suffers from considerable handicaps. The superiority of the United States Navy is, in fact, flagrant in the field of aircraft carriers (13, including 4 with nuclear propulsion, compared with 2 for the Soviets), using, moreover, aircraft

with very limited operational capabilities). There is also superiority in the field of the attack fleet, where supremacy of the American fleet is not shared by anyone (overall tonnage six times greater than its Soviet counterpart), increase superiority in the field of personnel and of equipment reliability, contributing to rates of presence at sea with no common measurement between the two navies.

Finally, in order to lessen the handicap caused by expansion of the main areas of tension or conflict, the United States is continuing to set up an outside action force equipped with considerable means, both in the field of intervention troop equipment (heavy equipment, armored equipment) and of sea and air transportation facilities (over 300 heavy transport aircraft).

In short, military competition continues between the United States and the Soviet Union and, I believe that I can state that it will continue at a strong, sustained pace.

General Destabilization of the World

At the same time, destabilizing forces are developing in the world. "There is a general destabilization of security in the world," the president of the Republic observed in 1975. This diagnosis agrees, today more than ever, with the reality that we observe. This destabilization corresponds, in fact, to the converging set of three kinds of trends, economic, political and military in nature.

Increase in the intensity of economic competition between nations is a major characteristic of the present evolution of international relations. Competition in a more and more vital search for natural resources first of all: energy sources, raw materials, wealth of the sea. Fierce competition in the field of trade by the producers of manufactured goods, whose field of action is, moreover, extending progressively to the entire world.

The economic world, which is become more and and more competitive, is also disorganized. The international monetary system set up after World War II has flown into pieces. Recourse to protectionist practices is not rare. Everywhere, inflation persists at a high rate. The indebtedness of the Third World amounts to sums from which it is no longer possible for it to come down.

In the political field, the sources of tension are no less strong. The movement for reopening the question of the bipolar international order that was imposed after World War II is expanding irresistibly.

Most of the countries on the planet are asserting more and more their desire for independence from any outside protection. Basically, this evolution is sound. It condemns future colonizations and contributes to a strengthening of the equality and freedom of nations. But, in the long transition period through which mankind is going at present, from a bipolar order to a multipolar structure, opportunities for confrontation can only be numerous.

Thus, the sources of conflict are increasing. At the same time, the military means for expressing these struggles are developing.

On the one hand, owing to the trend toward nuclear proliferation being experienced by the world. Of course, between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the European theater, nuclear arsenals have become an integral part of the overall military balance and consequently limit the risks of aggravation of the existing rivalries. But the appearance of nuclear weapons in troubled regions and in unstable countries would be apt to increase substantially the possibilities of open, murderous conflicts and even more of increasing the general risk of conflagration. That is why, moreover, France is striving to contribute to limiting and to organising the evolution of nuclear proliferation that is causing so much concern for the peace of the world.

Proliferation of traditional armament is older and universal. It continues without letup. Why be amazed at it? It is natural for a country acquiring independence to provide itself with means for protecting that independence against any foreign aggressor. In a perilous, disturbed world, the increase in production and purchase of armament is hardly surprising. Stimulated by the military escalation in which the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged and because the number of armament producers doubled a short time ago, it participates undeniably in the present climate of insecurity.

If the sources of conflict are multiplying, we must also note that, unfortunately, especially in Africa and the Middle East, when a conflict breaks out, it lasts, that is to say that it goes through periods of paroxysm and cold war leading very rarely to peace.

Major Technological Changes

Third large feature of the evolution of the international environment: major technological changes in the military field. Three changes seem singularly important to me for France's security.

In the first place, the evolution of nuclear missiles. On the one hand, an increase in the number of warheads, owing to development of the technique of multiple warhead missiles and especially of missiles with separately guided multiple warheads. Thus, one single missile can hit several definitely different targets. On the other hand, increase accuracy. I should like to mention some figures that summarize well the progress made in accuracy. So-called first-generation missiles, like the Soviet SS-9, had an accuracy on the order of 2,000 meters. The accuracy of the SS-20 missiles, that the Soviets are deploying at present, is around 300 to 400 meters. The accuracy of the Pershing-2 that the Americans have in process of development is around 50 meters. Progress is considerable and, therefore, is upsetting the fundamentals of the strategy of deterrence.

Second technological evolution: appreciable improvement of the means of surveillance and defense. I am thinking primarily of the improvement in detection equipment: on land, at sea and especially in the air and in space -- with satellites -- it is becoming possible to detect from a great distance and to observe with accuracy. I am also thinking of the improvement in the means of destruction: progress in electronics makes it possible to develop all kinds of missiles -- air-to-surface, air-to-sea, surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, sea-to-sea -- with spectacular performances of speed, penetration, accuracy and even of "intelligence."

Third technological evolution: increase in the offensive capability of traditional weapons, land, air and naval. This results particularly from the constant progress made in the field of mobility of those weapons: great maneuverability of tanks capable, for example, of firing while in motion, high speed of aircraft, both at high and very low altitude, owing to automatic terrain tracking equipment, great cruising range of nuclear-propelled ships.

This offensive capability of traditional weapons also results from the considerable developments observed in the evolution of armament and of weapon systems. They make it possible to obtain simultaneously an increased penetration capability and operational effectiveness, owing, primarily, to the use of highly accurate missiles, fired at long range, far from the enemy defenses, and to the use of constantly better performing ammunition (penetration shells, for example).

A ratio of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union that developed, in the last few years, to the benefit of the Soviet Union, because power was considerable, at any rate, on both sides, owing to the fact that competition of military means between the two superpowers is an irreducible relationship. A competitive world, disorganized, overarmed, seeking new balances. Constant improvement of the performation of nuclear and traditional weapons. All the above are the broad features of the evolution of France's international environment.

II. France's Defense Policy

What kind of defense police is France conducting with regard to this evolution?

Principles

How is our defense policy to be described? The objective is simple. It is a question of guaranteeing France's independence, of protecting its interests and of honoring its commitments. Four principles, closely tied to each other, stem from this.

First principle: France is conducting a national defense policy. As General de Gaulle said: "France's defense must be French.... If a country like France comes to the point of making war, it has to be its own war. Its effort has to be its own effort." That is why France withdrew from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. For all that, independence is not solitude. France, loyal to its friends, is still a member of the Atlantic Alliance.

Sometimes, I read or hear that this national approach to the problems of our country's security may seem to be anachronous, that in view of the increase in threats that I described a few moments ago France should reenter the ranks and strengthen Western solidarity, either by rejoining NATO or by joining a European defense system to be established. Need I point out how contrary to our country's underlying interests that kind of decision would be? On the one hand, in fact, the course of an independent European defense is not realistic at present. Europe still needs American support to balance Soviet power. On the other hand, it is clear that, although the Americans are our allies, they are only allies. How is it possible to imagine that they feel, in every circumstance, as involved as we in defense of our territory? The matter is closed. In view of number, of the complexity and of the uncertainties of the threats, France must retain its autonomy of decision. Today

like yesterday, our country intends to take charge of its security itself, that is to say to have the means needed for guaranteeing its defense and for deciding itself on the circumstances in which it should use them.

It is true that from an opposite point of view, other well-meaning people recommend that our country adopt a hypernational attitude. By breaking its alliances, by concentrating its strategy and its defense means on the metropolitan territory, France would proudly assert its desire to resist any foreign aggression. You can measure how ridiculous this kind of orientation toward proud isolation would be. Is it possible to imagine seriously that France can dissociate itself from its immediate environment, that is to say the balance of forces in Europe? Of course not. Our destiny cannot be separated from the destiny of the old continent to which we are tied, in addition to geography, by so much solidarity, the fruit of a long common history, of one and the same civilization and, for the last 30 years, a desire to act together. Moreover, is it necessary to point out how much concern France feels for all the risks of destabilization in the regions to which it is tied by its commitments or its interests? This was seen very well these last 2 months.

Second principle: France's defense is based on deterrence. As you know, this is a strategy of interdiction of war. It makes it possible to guarantee defense of our country's vital interests. This strategy is based, first of all, on strategic nuclear forces capable of inflicting intolerable damage on any possible aggressor whatsoever in the very heart of his own territory. It is based also on tactical nuclear forces and on traditional forces that enhance the deterrent impact of the strategic nuclear forces by making it possible for France not to find itself backed into a situation of "all or nothing."

I can only observe with pleasure how this strategy of deterrence, denigrated or misunderstood for a long time, has progressively assembled around it a deep-seated consensus in this country. France has no revenge to take, no border to modify, no hegemony to impose. That is say that a strategy of deterrence is the one best suited to our country's situation and dedication. Thanks to its military means and especially to its strategic nuclear forces, France can guarantee respect for its independence, regardless of what country may confront it.

Third principle: desire to have a capability of action. Beyond its vital interests, France must be in a position to ensure defense of its foreign interests and respect of its international commitments. As the prime minister said at Mailly-le-Camp, on 18 June 1977: "Our political and diplomatic activity can be exercised effectively only provided we can, if need be, rely on the presence and, if necessary, on the action of military means capable of supporting our friends in difficulty and of showing our determination and our resolve to back up our legitime claims or those of our friends." It is impossible to be more clear.

Fourth principle: recourse to the draft. You are familiar with the arguments of a "technical" nature militating in favor of the draft option. By furnishing an ample, stable and quality resource and by limiting tapping of the budgetary resources of the operating appropriations of the Armed Forces, this system is certainly the most efficient one. But this choice corresponds today, primarily, to a specific political desire. What is involved is the very nature of defense, which can only be the concern of the whole nation. This requirement is stimulated by the very nature of the policy of deterrence. It rests certainly on the personal desire of the president

of the Republic, taken over by carefully trained and fiercely determined Armed Forces, but this requirement also rests on the determination and participation of every citizen in the country's defense. I note, moreover, after the surveys conducted by the Armed Forces Information and Public Relations Service, that the proportion of our fellow citizens who believe that France would be unable to ensure its defense without military service has been increasing regularly since 1972 and is, at present, by far in the majority in this country.

Thus, the continuity of the principles of our defense policy finds expression. Therefore, the means of this policy must be strengthened and adapted.

Evolution of Means

Strengthening of means finds expression, first of all, in an increase in the budgetary outlay granted by the nation for its defense. The desire of the president of the Republic to maintain this outlay is expressed in a progression of the defense budget, with relation to the commercial Gross Domestic Product, from 3.41 percent in 1976 to 3.86 percent in 1981. I can personally measure the impact of this progression, when I think of my budget in 1974 and when I compare it with the budget that Le Theule has handed down to me today. I should like to point out how meritorious this progression -- for which a number of our allies envy us -- is. In fact, it was obtained in a period of economic difficulties tied to the world crisis and of subsequent budgetary penury unprecedented in the history of our country since the war.

How will this outlay evolve in the future? This should be one of the major topics for reflection by those who will prepare the future program act. I shall not conceal it from you: in view of the increase and diversification of threats, in view of the rise in costs making it necessary to develop constantly better performing armament, the task will be hard. In fact, it could not be a question of jeopardizing the country's economic and social development by tapping the nation's resources excessively. More than ever before, strictness will be indispensable. Strictness in the choice of equipment, strictness in administration of programs, strictness in everyday living.

I should like to be more specific with regard to the choice of equipment. How is France to adapt its military means to its ambitions and its possibilities? It seems to me that we must respect two rules in a search for maximum effectiveness:

All the means required for their development and production must be allocated, without hesitation, to essential equipment and especially to nuclear armament.

With regard to other armament, it should be on a par with the best foreign equipment, if the operational advantage resulting from this is really substantial and, of course, consistent with our missions. Otherwise, it is necessary to seek the most suitable compromises between the reasonable operational specifications and costs capable of being obtained.

Naturally I cannot foresee, at present, the conclusions of the work of preparation of the future program act. But, as you know, a certain number of decisions have already been made. Programs are in process of moving along, either in the research stage or in the production stage.

Without listing all of them, I should like to mention a certain number of them by selecting the ones that seem to me to be the most important of the extraordinary effort of adaptation of its armament that France is putting in effect and intends to pursue in the future. I shall indicate our nuclear capabilities, on the one hand, and our traditional capabilities, on the other.

Nuclear Forces

As I pointed out a short time ago, our nuclear forces are the basic instrument of our deterrence strategy. That is why we must never slack off our effort, although their present status is amply sufficient to ake the desired deterrent effort. What is involved?

In the field of strategic nuclear forces, it is a question of strengthening our strike capability by increasing the number of our missiles and of our nuclear warheads, by reducing the vulnerability of the launchers to any enemy attack and by increasing the penetration power of our missiles.

That is why we have undertaken construction of a sixth missile-launching nuclear submarine, characterized by remarkable acoustic discrimination and capability of detecting any enemy threat. That is why, also, we are continuing to prepare a replacement, on our SNLE [missile-launching submarine], of the M-20 missile with the M-4 equipped with multiple warheads and a longer range. The submarine "Inflexible" will by itself by able to hit several dozen targets with nuclear warheads, each of which will have a power greater than 100 kilotons. Thus, within our strategic nuclear forces, we are consolidating the central place of the submarine component. In comparison with the technological evolution of the missiles of other nuclear powers -- number and accuracy -- it is, in fact, still the one most invulnerable.

For all that, we are continuing to strengthen the effectiveness of the other components.

Must I point out that, next year, we shall have completed some important work, at Albion, after which the S-2 missiles will be replaced with S-3, characterized by a better penetration capability and a megaton power?

The strategic air component will also be reevaluated qualitatively. About 15 Mirage IV will be modernized. Moderned systems of navigation and of electronic warfare will give this aircraft new youth. The ASMP [medium-range air-to-surface] missile, with a range of over 100 kilometers, will make it possible to extend the delivery radius of the nuclear weapon, with increased penetration that makes it possible to approach low-altitude missiles, and less vulnerability for the aircraft that will be able to fire while remaining beyond the range of enemy defenses.

All in all, our strategic nuclear forces will be much more powerful in a few years. But we are already preparing for a more distant future, the future of the 1990's. Some important studies are being conducted at present on a mobile surface-to-surface strategic launcher. By reducing considerably its vulnerability with regard to the accuracy of the new weapons that I mentioned a short time ago, its mobility could make it a singularly deterrent weapon. Like other countries, we are also examining what might be a new generation of nuclear submarines: extension of the patrol area by means of increasing the range of the missiles, strengthening of detection discrimination and capability, increase in firing rate and adaptation of capabilities

of penetrating defenses that might appear on that horizon. These are all topics on which our researchers are reflecting at present.

A few words on tactical nuclear armament. You know that this is a deterrence weapon intended for playing a transitory role. Its action stops conventional combat and announces recourse to the strategic nuclear weapon, with all its consequences. This year, the Navy's Super-Etendard formation that will be equipped with this armament will be added to the five Air Force squadrons carrying the AN-52 nuclear weapon. In the short term, this armament will be replaced by the medium-range air-to-surface missile (ASMP) both for naval air combat aircraft and for the Mirage 2000 of the tactical air force. I shall come back to the remarkable features of this aircraft shortly.

Finally, still with a concern for preparing for the distant future, we are pursuing some important studies at present. Some concern the possibility of increasing the range of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. Others concern the neutron bomb. There again, if these programs are finally initiated, it is a question of expanding the maneuvering margin of the political authority -- which controls use of nuclear armament -- by increasing the deterrence possibilities established by the ANT [Tactical Nuclear Armament] in a variety of situations and by strengthening the complementarity of the various systems.

Traditional Forces

Now let us come to the traditional forces.

In the coming years, the Navy's means will, undoubtedly, undergo the most spectacular changes. In addition to its traditional missions, the Navy is witnessing an extension into fields in which it is apt to be called upon to provide its collaboration: protection of our sea communications, support of foreign operations, surveillance of economic zones -- extended recently to 200 nautical miles -- public service tasks of a nonmilitary nature.

That is why we have undertaken a vast effort to modernize the Navy's means. Just think that, from 1977 to 1990, the proportion of the tonnage of our surface ships that will not have exceeded half of their useful life will go from about one-fourth to three-fourths! These ships, equipped with very high performance missiles, provided with the most modern electronic equipment -- radars, passive and active electronic systems, automated information processing and exchanging system, underwater detection equipment -- will be able to face up to any surface, air or underwater threat under the best conditions. Moreover, in the longer term, I emphasize, our two aircraft carriers, the "Foch" and the "Clemenceau," will be replaced by nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers.

We are no less ambitious in the field of submarines. We have initiated a program for building 10 nuclear attack submarines. Their silence, their staying-power, their mobility will give them a very enhanced operational effectiveness in comparison with diesel submarines. Their vulnerability will, in fact, be definitely less. Their radius of action will be practically unlimited and their offensive capability will be greatly increased. The first one, the "Rubis," will go into active service as early as next year.

I cannot leave the Navy without mentioning naval aviation. We are equipping ourselves, at present, with Super-Etendard aircraft and Lynx helicopters. Soon, we shall have the Atlantic Nouvelle Generation [New Generation Atlantic (ANG)], which will have especially sophisticated weapn systems for antisurface and antisubmarine warfare.

With regard to the A'r Force, you know that much equipment is in process of production or acquisition at present. I have chosen to discuss three programs with you. They are certainly unequal in extent, but they seem to me to illustrate eloquently both the variety of the Air Force's missions and our concern for giving it the means for carrying them out in the best possible way.

First program: the Mirage 2000. In every respect, this extremely multipurpose aircraft will be remarkable. It will cause us to take a substantial step forward in comparison with the previous generation, owing, particularly, to an intensive utilization of data-processing, to the use of new materials in airframe construction, and to the navigation systems with which it will be equipped. Capability of taking off from short runways, excellent climbing speed, flight in excess of Mach 2 up to 18,000 meters, detection and firing ability at every altitude and under any conditions, defense capability against very advanced enemy guided weapons. All these are advantages that will make this a completely exceptional aircraft. I tell you clearly today that the Mirage 2000 will make a very great contribution in the future, as its predecessors did in the past, to the prestige of French technological know-how.

Second program: the Transall. Certain recent events have emphasized the need for France to be able to transport the means for executing an action far and quickly. That is to say, the timeliness of the decision made to equip our Air Force with 25 additional Transall aircraft. These aircraft -- whose deliveries will be staggered between this year and 1984 -- are particularly suitable for foreign actions. Their takeoff and landing capabilities especially on a short runway are exceptional. Much more, the Transall aircraft that we are going to receive soon will have improved performances in comparison with their predecessors. In fact, they have an increased fuel capacity and an inflight refueling system enabling them to operate nonstop in distant theaters of operations.

Third program: development of low altitude detection equipment on the ground. Like France, other countries are equipping themselves with very high performance aircraft c able especially of flying at very low altitude and at high speed. That is why, in view of this evolution of the threat, in order to strengthen our antiaircraft defense, we have decided to equip ourselves, on our borders and around senstive places, with Centaure and Aladin radars that will enable us to detect the approach of any enemy aircraft flying close to the ground. The first deliveries of this equipment will take place starting in 1982. Later, this radar network will be supplemented by an airborne detection system that is under study and evaluation right now.

Why have I decided to conclude with the Army? Please do not see in this the vanity of a former armored corps officer like me.

See in it, rather, my pleasure that the reorganization of the Army is now essentially almost completed. A strong effort has been made to give it more pugnacity, more

flexibility, more polyvalence, in a word, more effectiveness. In view of the variety of threats, it is a question of enabling it always to be ready and strong.

For this purpose, it is providing itself with new equipment that improves its fire power and its mobility considerably. There, too, I have chosen three very different but illustrative programs.

First of all the Famas. The units are now beginning to be equipped with this assault rifle. I shall not stress its performance, which is now very well known. But I should like to point out how its ease of handling, its accuracy, the variety of its employment possibilities make it a weapon perfectly meeting the requirements of modern combat. In this connection and because it is the weapon of the individual combatant, it seems to me that it illustrates a simple, basic reality: the progressive, irreversible transition of our traditional forces from the postwar era to the era of the end of the second millennium.

Second program: the new 155 gun with a high rate of fire. With this gun, our artillery acquires new power. In fact, it makes it possible to fire faster -- owing especially to the automated data-processing and fire control system (Atila system) -- farther and more effectively.

Against the land threat, represented by very mobile, powerfully armed armored formations, it will contribute, together with our surface-to-surface missiles and helicopters, to increasing the Army's antitank warfare capability.

Third program: the tank. You know that 1981 will be the year when the AMX-30-B2 tank goes into service. It is a definitely improved version of the AMX-30-B. The progress that it brings involves both fire control (introduction of integrated automatic fire control) and mobility (owing to a new gearbox) and protection (owing to a new overall pressurization device). Equipped with the 105-millimeter penetration shell, it is a high performance tank. Nevertheless, we must already think of its successor. This is the objective of the studies that we are making at present with our German friends on what we call the 90 Tank. I do not doubt that the alliance of the experience of the German tank builders and of the French technological capabilities will enable us to have, by the end of the century, a tank that will be on a par with the best world level.

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SUPPORT VOICED FOR 'BALANCED FORCES' STRATEGY

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 81 pp 55-59

[Article by Vice Admiral (retired) Paul Delahousse: "The Consequences of the Strategy Based on Nuclear Deterrence and the 'Battle'"]

[Text] Balanced Military Machine

Judging from the strategy that has just been described, the defense of France cannot be based on a deadlock, a deadlock in terms of the position it must occupy in the "battle" over the major theater in the event of a confrontation. The response to the "indirect" threat, the gravity of which grows from year to year, particularly at sea, renders the deadlock over the means other than that of a strategic nuclear force doubly impossible.

France must have at its disposal a military machine "balanced" between conventional and nuclear weapons and, generally speaking, between the three components of any defense: men, equipment, troop activity.

In spite of all opposition, in the course of the past 20 years France has equipped itself with a nuclear tool that sets it among the ranks of the world's leading nations. But in the field of conventional weapons, delays, postponements and cancellations have come to be common occurrences and everything that contributes to getting into operational condition, and therefore to credibility as to our defense, was until 1975 sacrificed beyond reasonable limits: equipment maintenance, ammunition, fuel, training — to say nothing of the standard of living of the military.

This situation had to be remedied. Apparently, this was the objective the government set itself in 1976, all the while very explicitly maintaining the priority status of nuclear weapons:

"The new method of programming is presented as being open to everything in order to maintain a balance between the three factors which form the basis for the effectiveness of an army: the quality and morale of the men, operational training and the existence of a coherent whole of modern weapons. It attempts to establish the desired balance between nuclear and conventional forces."

As far as I am concerned, I fully adhere to this way of looking at things.

Adapting Effort to Ambition

A nuclear and balanced defense, that is, a responsible and credible one, is expensive. If it were less balanced, as the kind some people are still advocating would be, it would also be expensive. There is no real defense "that costs less," as some people here or there have deluded themselves into thinking.

In 1974 the French military budget dropped to 2.96 percent of the GNP. It is obvious to anyone with an ounce of common sense that with that kind of money you cannot pay for a nuclear arsenal of any size, maintain a conventional system on this side of which there is no credible defense, provide for putting the military machine into operational condition without which it exists merely on paper and lastly ensure the lives of people as they should be.

In 1981 the military budget will climb back to some 3.4 percent of the GNP. There is reason to congratulate ourselves, particularly in view of the economic conditions under which the effort is being made. But we must admit that we have had extreme difficulty in simultaneously maintaining the priorities necessary to a nuclear arsenal and restoring our conventional forces to a minimal level in terms of volume and getting them into shape.

It has been established that the burden of operational expenditures, which are incapable of being further trimmed — unless we adopt the line of least resistance with a massive cutback of troops — the very high cost of maintenance or development of our nuclear capability and the galloping costs of conventional weapons cannot be satisfied with moderate growth, considering the clearly inadequate level from which the effort decided on 5 years ago was launched.

The problem that is posed today is not one of improvement, but of adapting effort to ambition, failing which we would be forced to engage in the opposite adaptation. Between now and 1982, the final year of the program now in course, that portion of the GNP devoted to defense will have to reach a minimal figure of 4 percent if we are to break the deadlock.

Why 4 percent of the GNP, or in more up-to-date terms 4.5 percent of the marketable GDP? In comparison with what our neighbors of similar size and with the same ambitions are doing and with reference to the level maintained in France during the period from 1965 to 1968, the objective appears to be economically reasonable. Will it be high enough to resolve the problem? Undoubtedly not. But the socioeconomic imperatives impose limits on us which it would be unrealistic to think of exceeding. Simultaneously with the national effort, we must develop real European cooperation in the domain of arms.

A Reexamination of NATO Internal Relations

We can no longer countenance a deadlock over NATO, which remains vital to our security. As anyone with an ounce of common sense can see, this was at the heart of the step taken in spring of 1976.

"It would be self-deluding to expect France to be able to preserve anything more than diminished national sovereignty if its neighbors were to be occupied by an enemy power or were to simply fall under its domination. The security of Western Europe

as a whole is therefore essential to France... Under the present circumstances NATO alone is in a position to serve as a counterweight to the considerable military potential of the nations assembled under the wing of the Warsaw Pact... In making this choice, France will d splay its awareness of the solidarity that unites it with its allies... and its determination to assume the role incumbent on it in the common defense."*

As I do with regard to a balancing of the military machine, I fully adhere to this way of looking at things and hope that the practical inferences pertaining thereto will be drawn.

Where are with NATO? The situation is hardly satisfactory, which is the least we can say about it, judging in particular from the differences over the response that should be brought to bear against Soviet theater-scale nuclear weapons, over deployment of the so-called neutron bomb in Europe and over the effort agreed on by the European nations for their defense. And more generally speaking, judging from the disagreement in the West's reaction to the crises that are shaking the world — noting, however, that the great fear over Poland seems to have for the moment re-welded solidarities.

More particularly, as regards our own relations with NATO, there is the "flexible response," some aspects of which we hope to specify or shape, and the matter of the command structures, which are unacceptable in their present form. On the other hand, we must realize that the gap between some "dialogue" and the reality of our positions may have given our partners cause for concern.

A profound reexamination of NATO-internal relations appears to be necessary. In a threefold sense:

An updating, demanded by a situation radically different from the one that existed when the alliance was concluded.

An adaptation to the global nature of the Soviet strategy.

A consideration of Europe's specific role.

Simultaneously with the search for concerted actions suited to the world outside the area covered by NATO, we must engage in a process capable of leading us to the position of "European pillar" of the alliance. Favorable elements appear to have joined forces across the Rhine, across the English Channel, no doubt across the Atlantic, for us to initiate a dialogue rendered urgent by the events of these past few months.

For some time now, here and there in France, there has been talk "of a European army," of FRG participation in the military nuclear effort, of the combining of French and British nuclear forces into a "European deterrent force." In my opinion, all this seems to be unrealistic. A neutralist objective is more evident. Certain new fanatics in favor of a military Europe do not conceal the fact that they are aiming at separating the Europeans from the United States through this expedient. The restoration of security in the free world cannot be achieved through an approach like this. The problem must be tackled within the framework of NATO, pragmatically, by attacking in all directions — strategy, arms cooperation, the nuclear problem,

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* Preamble to the Military Programming Law of 19 June 1976.

inter-European and inter-Atlantic coordinating organizations — by attacking, therefore, everything we can at this time, for lack of the opportunity to attack desirable, but still impracticable targets.

And in my opinion, there are three conditions for the dialogue — if it is engaged in — to be a positive one:

France must dispel certain ambiguities which, in the eyes of its allies, weigh heavily on its position in the alliance.

As for our partners, they must depart from the view of a conventional "NATO" which blocks any possibility of evolution.

We must dare to tackle the issue of the specific position of the French and British nuclear forces in terms of the perspective of the "European pillar."

Strong because of its special position, its totally independent nuclear capability and the beefing up of its military machine that has been pursued since 1976, it is up to France to assume the initiative in the dialogue, limited at first for obvious reasons of effectiveness to ourselves, the Germans and the British.

If we do not wish to assume this initiative, if we believe that we cannot do so because our adherents of independence or the Soviets would not like it, Great Britain will make the inevitable choice of its "special ties" with the United States and the FRG will at best rally to the Anglo-Saxon camp or at worst be tempted to slip into neutralism.

Then there would be nothing for France to do but fall back on itself in the illusion that it could defend itself alone.

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LISTENERS DEBATE EXPERTS' VIEWS ON EUROPEAN STRATEGY

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Mar 81 pp 61-83

[Report on open debate between speakers: Generals Valentin, Callois and Thiry and Admiral Delahousse, and members of the audience by M.D.: "Battle in Europe: Question Mark"; passages in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] The Debate

The debate which on 17 December followed the talks of the four speakers who formed the subject of the four previous articles forms the basis for a reconstruction that has been structured in terms of four main themes: the battle, strategy and policy, major defense priorities and the SS-20 and Euromissiles.

The questions and comments that have been raised in each of these domains have been regrouped and are followed by the replies of the different speakers. Furthermore, this forced us to cut up and rearrange the replies to bring them closer to those who had elicited them, nevertheless repeating the names of the speakers each time to enable the reader to link them with the statements made at the start of the meeting.

At any rate, we should bear in mind that their authors alone are responsible for the ideas freely expressed in the course of the meeting. The very principle involved in these meeting-debates is to let the participants enjoy absolute freedom of expression, with their statements being reported in a form that is modified only to allow for the translation of the spoken into the written word and to eliminate a few digressions from the main topic. Obviously, this review does not assume responsibility for any of the opinions expressed which, moreover, are very often contradicted a few lines or a few pages farther on.

A. The Battle

Listener Opinions

[Listener 1] I raise an objection to General Valentin's remarks inasmuch as, if the ideas as to how to employ our maneuvering forces remain well within the framework anticipated once they are regrouped under French command, where they would possibly be used as a NATO reserve, the plan he has presented would require more detailed developments, and not only with regard to the problem of fire power coordination. Furthermore, could we resort to tactical nuclear weapons first? In this domain

we have to consider the consequences of an enemy nuclear counterthrust, which could be devastating, and the repercussions it might have on our own strategy of deterrence.

[Listener 2] It would be interesting to know the probability rating each of the speakers assigns the risks of a battle in Europe. For example, does General Gallois rate the probability as absolutely nil, which would enable us to eliminate a large number of technical problems? On the other hand, if the probability is only very low, we would have to anticipate what kind of battle might occur.

[Listener 3] General Gallois is no doubt right in not wanting to underestimate the opponent, but perhaps he has a tendency to overestimate him? There is in fact little likelihood that this opponent could succeed in blowing up NATO's entire force with one volley, taking into consideration here not NATO's current disposition of troops, but one which it would be easy to protect against this kind of action through precautions that are fairly simple to adopt. Moreover, after that first volley we would again be confronted with the preceding problem, in which event tanks would probably have a role to plan [in the conflict].

What we would then have to consider is the awful vulnerability of ground forces in the face of a multiplication of nuclear weapons. If we are prepared to engage in a battle similar to those that took place at the end of the last war, the battle will be lost before the first shot is fired. We must therefore rethink the whole business in terms of a modern technology that does not stop with the neutron bomb.

Speaker Replies

General Valentin: I admit that, in a nuclear atmosphere in which tactical nuclear weapons are used, the intervention of our conventional forces would be difficult. This would be no less the case for the enemy forces. Just as is General Hublot, I am quite familiar with the urban web of West Germany, but you cannot claim that this web, with the roads that crisscross it, makes any maneuvering impossible. Furthermore, we have no intention of performing maneuvers of the same type or scope as those of the Soviets. We do not want to cross the borders of Both Czechoslovakia and East Germany, nor all of the most difficult areas. We said that we could engage in local actions over a front that corresponds to our capabilities, that is, from 100 to 120 km, after carefully studying a number of possible operations. We said that we felt that these operations would be difficult and that the military command would not fail to advise the government that this operation is too difficult and that one, onethe other hand, is within our capabilities.

It is not a simple matter, but you do not find out how to play chess by smashing the chessboard. We have to find a solution to a problem we are confronted with and which it is not absolutely impossible to resolve.

Admiral Delahousse and General Thiry seem to be saying that our relations with NATO are such that, in the event of a conflict, it would be difficult to achieve effective cooperation in the field within the desired deadlines. I would make the observation that we have gone from a system of integration to a system of alliance. This system is not necessarily bad. We have relations with NATO that go back to the time when we got away from the integrated system. They have, moreover, shown themselves to be much easier than those we had when we belonged to the system.

Of course, we do not have a force available that is as ready [to go into action] as we would like, but we must not go to the other extreme. Considering what is going on now in Europe and considering the Soviet arsenal, which we are quite familiar with, this force represents something of importance whose role would not be a negligible one, even if we can only conduct a specific action within a limited area.

General Gallois: Earlier, I alluded to the convergence that has today been reached between certain texts published by Soviet generals and specialists and weapons now being deployed, specifically, the SS-20, 21 and 22 (in accordance with the terminology used by NATO).

Thus in the "Officer's Manual"[1] the authors express themselves in the following manner: "the Soviet military doctrine extends the decisive role... to nuclear missiles..." "The Basic Principles of the Art of Tactics and Operations"[2] is more explicit: "the principle of simultaneous action over the full depth of the enemy disposition and over the most distant objectives behind the lines is now, thanks to nuclear weapons, based on realistic and solid foundations..."; "...the employment of nuclear weapons will be effected suddenly and en masse over the full depth of the deployment of the enemy combat forces with, as targets of destruction, groupings of tanks, artillery..., the chief command posts..., etc."

Speaking of a war in which the Red Army were to intervene, Colonel Sidorenko[3] gives the same version: "Since nuclear weapons are the chief means of destruction, they should be employed in all cases for the annihilation of the most important objectives. These are the enemy's means of nuclear attack, his troop concentrations, his tanks, his reserves, etc."

Colonel Sidorenko's analysis does not confine itself to describing the initial surprise attack. He in fact goes on to say: "Nuclear weapons do not prepare the attack nor do they support the action of tanks and infantry. Nuclear weapons accomplish the most important missions by destroying almost all of the chief enemy forces... Their employment is different and they are to be considered as /completely deviating from/ the usual concept of a fire power system... nuclear attacks and ground troop operations constitute a uniform whole within an overall concept."

This is how Marshal Sokolovsky[4] summed up the conclusions of high-level subordinates: "Immediately /after/ the nuclear attacks, airborne troops are brought in ready for action and the armored attack begins."

Soviet authors have, therefore, reached the conclusion that nuclear fire power must be separated from intervention by conventional air and ground forces. The former would disarm the enemy from a distance by speculating, naturally, on the element of surprise and the latter would occupy the terrain with airborne troops and tanks, and as Major General Konikov and Colonel Shamansky[5] write: "... the /final/ defeat of the enemy troops, the capture of their territory and /the establishment of appropriate order and peaceful control/ over postwar activities can only be achieved through ground troop operations."

In other words, the "breakthrough" force is no longer the tank, but the precision ballistic missile. Airborne troops and tanks follow and occupy a disarmed territory and play the role of a force of occupation and political control, as they have for over 30 years in the Eastern European countries. Soviet experts, furthermore,

eliminate the notion of a continuous front — which still has adherents in the West — and General Shtemenko[6] puts it this way: "Penetration of a defense organization will not be accomplished by "gnawing away at it" as we did during the last war, but by launching nuclear attacks and following them up with rapid movements of tanks and mechanized infantry."

This is how a doctrine looks that was developed as early as several years ago but the instruments of which are being deployed to become operational in a very short time from now. Naturally, the SS-20's, about which there has been a lot of talk for several months now, figure among these new means of remote action. The Americans credit them with a probable margin of error on the order of 400 meters with their extra-long-range model (SS-16). Over much shorter distances, from 1,500 to 1,800 km, the Eurostrategic version of this missile is supposed to have a precision range of from 200 to 250 meters. It is not very likely that, in the manner of the Americans, the Soviets will reduce the destructive energy of their ballistic missiles as they increase the precision. This adaptation of nuclear fire power with a probable circular margin of error is already in use since the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles have apparently been used to carry explosive charges in the megaton range whereas the SS-20 missiles, at least those of American origin, are in the upper kiloton range. And still following closely on the heels of the American experts, we do not see why the Soviets do not follow the example of their major rivals and adapt the destructive energy that propels their missiles to the size and nature of the objectives they are aimed at. This would enable them to disarm [the enemy] from a distance with very little collateral damage. The territories occupied following such an operation could then be made to contribute [to the effort] without any difficulty since the means of production as well as the local populations would not have — or only slightly so — suffered the horrors of war, as has occurred in Europe and elsewhere in the world with conventional weapons.

Considering the current nature and deployment of the NATO European nations' armed forces, this would appear to be the maximal danger for them, that is, the one that has to be taken into consideration since this kind of warfare would best suit both the long-term policy and immediate interests of the party assuming the initiative. Let us not forget that we now find ourselves in a situation in which we may have to go through a war and are in no position to assume the initiative and conduct it to suit our interests.

Listener: It is hard to understand and even harder to explain why, once one plans a battle, it is conceived of as a counteroffensive after it has been lost the first time round. Therefore, one wonders why one should not want to fight such a battle as far as possible from our borders rather than close to them.

Speaker Replies

General Valentin: I never said anything about a second battle. Furthermore, there will be no first battle, rather a very deep combat zone. We are incapable of intervening in the front ranks from our peacetime positions. I think that this situation is favorable from all points of view. We have the means for intervening in the rear lines of the depth of the battlefield and no one feels that such intervention is impossible. Here in the country of Conde and Napoleon, should we consider the French forces to be incapable of assuming the initiative and mounting an offensive? Actually, history indicates that all the catastrophes: Metz in 1870, Sedan in 1940,

Stalingrad and Dien-Bien-Phu, occurred when mobility was rejected to adopt a static approach. Any line located along the iron curtain and fully perceived by the enemy will be much easier for him to destroy than mobile forces. We ourselves know how hard it is for us to spot our objectives.

General Thiry: A battle fought along a second line cannot be successful. Our defenses would be tellingly brushed aside by nuclear weapons to open the way to the enemy. While we talk about combat in depth, this does not, nevertheless, mean all of Europe. This depth may be limited to a glacis which, as we have said, ought to be as far forward as possible. The important thing is to stop the enemy.

The notion of a forward battle has been criticized, some claiming that the expression is ambiguous. It is, however, clear: A forward battle is one whose objective is to keep the enemy from penetrating the territory to be defended.

General Gallois: It would be preferable to talk of a vulnerability zone rather than a combat zone. In view of the arsenal the Warsaw Pact forces now possess and the doctrine posted by the Soviet high command, we must exclude the notion of "battle," in the usual sense of the word, involving an exchange of prolonged attacks. Remember what General Shtemenko wrote to the effect that "gnawing away at" the front seemed to him to be an outmoded notion.

3. Strategy and Policy

Listener: General Thiry draws our attention to a certain number of categories: absolutists, traditionalists and relativists, to which we must no doubt add the integrationists and lastly the neutralists.

These categories must be put into their proper context: At the root of it, we always find the political plan. To realize it when confronted with an enemy involves a strategy which, in the face of a threat, implies the means to do so. This is a relatively logical sequence. By operating on one of the terms, we can modify the other one. We can thus modify the political plan by operating on certain of the terms subsequent to it. One of the first ways of doing this consists of proposing methods which, by their very nature, weigh so heavily on the budget that we are forced to change our strategy and, therefore, the political plan. A second way of doing it is to propose methods that modify the strategy without going through financial channels, for example, because they involve more intensive integration of forces, which in fact threatens the political plan.

In 1976 arguments were submitted that seemed to add a European orientation to General de Gaulle's political plan for independence, which could have entailed a modification of the strategy, as we might have been led to believe by the terms, "expanded deterrence" and "forward battle." These interpretations were later corrected, not so much due to "Gaullist" pressure, but because of the very nature of nuclear weapons, which does not correspond to the strategic change one might have supposed. It is in fact absolutely pointless to envisage a really expanded ability to provide a sanctuary for ourselves with the military machine currently available to us.

If we really anticipate engaging in a "forward battle" with our allies and under any circumstances whatsoever, we will be forced to integrate to a greater degree than allowed for in the political plan. Moreover, our country would inevitably become

the logistic site of such a battle, which would jeopardize our entire nuclear strategy. In short, no matter how you look at it, any consideration of a forward battle, involving integration with our allies, would jeopardize our political plan due to the expedient of the strategy.

Great Britain has a policy and a strategy. This policy, which is in no way like ours, pressures that country into serving as the United States' proxy in Europe, not into wanting to defend Europe with us. Hoping that this policy will be changed is not enough for it to actually happen. Our allies have the right to have their own policies, different from ours. In denying this fact, we risk winding up with an unrealistic position, proclaiming that France has a specific policy while it is at the same time aligning itself with that of the others.

Speaker Replies

General Valentin: It has been said with a great deal of eloquence that there is a political action that affects the choice of weapons and a reaction engendered by the choice of weapons, or even of the armed force, that affects the political policy. I agree with this in principle but at the same time one has the impression that people think there is a change in progress moving in the direction of a greater probability of intervention alongside our allies than in the past. This seems to me to be quite inaccurate. At the same time we left NATO, we signed the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements on General de Gaulle's orders. I, personally, have signed other agreements which serve merely as a complement to them, which were, moreover, provided for in the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements and which fully respect the French Government's freedom of choice since they do not provide for any automatic intervention.

General Calloix: I would like to remind you that the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements go back some 15 years now. Given the revolution that took place during this interval and despite their very great value, they can be laid open to question.

General Thiry: People here have talked about the effect of the political plan on our strategy, ways of confronting the threat and possibilities of reciprocal action. I agree with these ideas, but the word, "independence," has been mentioned in connection with them. No one is against his country's independence but, if we push that notion too far, particularly as concerns defense, we will end up either isolated or neutral. "The duty of the prince," Machiavelli says, "is to have a good army and good friends." If it is possible to conceive of a system whereby France's security and its defense would be better guaranteed through less independence, I would opt for such lesser independence.

Admiral Delahousse: The problem France is currently facing is that of an adaptation of effort to ambition. If we do not want to engage in this adaptation, we will have to engage in the opposite kind, that of ambition to limited means. When a country is ambitious to have a modern, nuclear and independent defense, it has to make the appropriate financial effort. Now we allocate for our defense a portion of our GNP that is less than that assigned by the British, who receive aid from the Americans for their nuclear force, and the Germans, who don't have a nuclear force.[7]

The notion of balanced military forces, objected to by some, must be interpreted negatively when we take inventory of the present imbalance. The French Army has

four times less tanks than the Czechoslovaks, the Poles and the East Germans. Two-thirds of the Navy's ships are obsolete with no replacements in sight. The British have 12 operational nuclear-powered attack submarines. As for the modern, advanced capital ship, we don't have a single one.[8] In December 1975 the Air Force had to abandon the combat plane of the future and, therefore, has no twin-jet combat plane, whereas the Germans and the British have the Tornado.

Speaking of neutralism, it is important to call attention to certain statements made in a paper on defense published in June 1980 by a big political party. In particular, we read in it that, if the Soviets were to attack Europe, what would take place in the FRG would not "directly" concern France. Statements of this sort and the almost religious presentation of the notion of "sanctuary" ineluctably lead to neutralism. The fact that the French Communist Party in May 1977 rallied to the cause of nuclear armament and the most extreme doctrines surrounding it is proof of the neutralist logic of basing our defense on the notion of sanctuary.

As for us, where a so-called change of strategy is at issue, we quite simply want to make the "dialogue" conform to the profound reality of French policy. The French have to know where they stand and their allies also have to know where the French stand in the event of a serious crisis.

The British have just chosen the Trident. To replace their Polaris, they could have made a purely national effort, which they did not want to do in order to avoid throwing their military machine out of balance, or bought an American missile, which they have just decided to do, or cooperated with the French. This last choice was not possible in the absence of a dialogue over fundamental problems of defense between France and Great Britain, even though the two countries do cooperate in the manufacture of certain weapons, such as the Jaguar and the Exocet.

For Great Britain, as for us, the question arises as to how absolute the American guarantee to Europe is. For this reason, and for others, it hopes that the importance of Europe's role in the common defense will be taken into account inside NATO. It tried to initiate a dialogue with us on defense in 1971-1972, when one of the rare "European" Englishmen, Edward Heath, was prime minister. The helping hand then extended was refused in the name of "independence." Recently, in Bordeaux on 19 September 1980, Mrs Thatcher said that she was ready to talk defense with us, thus renewing the offer made in the early 1970's.

C. Major Defense Priorities

Listener: Too often, the French military effort has not seemed to correspond to the desires and missions that have been established. GNP growth is now almost nil. Up to now, inflation has eroded all plans. As far as the strategic nuclear force is concerned, we will have objectives for 1990 that we should have achieved by now. Under the circumstances, does General Valentin believe that we currently have at our disposition a complete tactical force, quite guaranteed and one that constitutes a true reserve? The military's obligation to the government is to inform it as to its real capabilities in terms of the funds allocated for them. If there is agreement on the political plan, the question can be raised as to which military tool is the most effective. As regards the strategic nuclear arm, apparently it would be the Navy. We would also have to make a considerable effort to build up a real force for intervention. We in fact have need of large forces, in particular in the

Mediterranean, perhaps two divisions with their supporting units, tanks and means of transportation.

Speaker Replies

General Valentin: We will really be forced to act if the Soviet Union launches a direct attack through a combined movement of the Warsaw Pact forces. This is an assumption we are really forced to consider. The Russians have large forces and have armed their satellites. The Chinese never fail to point out that the bulk of the Soviet armies is aimed at the West.

I did not say that I considered General Gallois' argument was impossible. I have always pointed out that at some time in the future it would no doubt be one of the valid assumptions. I have merely observed that we must not limit ourselves to one assumption. For the moment the Soviets continue to investigate powerful forces of destruction and are not at present moving toward less powerful forces, including weapons made directly available to army corps. As for the precision of their missiles, the information we possess is very fragmentary and this is even true for the Americans. It is possible that the Soviets will completely change their policy and adopt General Gallois' thesis, but we at present have no evidence that this is the case.

General Gallois goes along with the assumption that there is a Soviet world which assumes the initiative and is absolutely sure of itself. I have specifically stated that in my opinion what makes the present situation so disturbing is not so much the existence on the part of the Soviets of a deliberate desire for aggression, but the possibility that an accidental situation may arise, born of the internal tensions of the communist world. The outlook is, therefore, quite different.

General Gallois: Immediately after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Americans and their European allies worked out a military defense system consisting of two components: Simply put, let us say that it was up to the United States to wield its nuclear weapons with the European countries being limited to the mobilization of conventional forces. This binary system has perfectly achieved the objectives the allied governments assigned to it and the dividing line between the two opposed societies has not budged by so much as an inch. It is true that, aside from their nuclear forces, the United States has deployed conventional units which have also contributed to the strength of the deterrent.

Today, on the other side of the Atlantic, many voices have been raised demanding that the Western European countries assume full responsibility for their defense and security. These European countries are now economically speaking out of hot water and they ought to be capable of seeing to the maintenance of their territorial and political status quo in Europe themselves. Those in the United States who voice such opinions forget that their country imposed on its European allies a military disposition that is only effective when complemented by U.S. nuclear weapons. Moreover, Washington exerted itself to have all its allies sign the nonproliferation treaty, which imposes the presence of American troops on the soil of these allied countries for an undetermined, but certainly very long, period of time. Considering only the chief nations of Western Europe, we have to admit that five governments of these nations out of six know that they depend on the presence of American troops on their territories for the defense of their countries.

Then too, any European political arrangement is hampered by the obligation these governments are under to maintain at any cost the military presence of the United States on their soil. And in connection with economic and industrial affairs, when a choice has to be made between a European solution and an American solution, the government in Washington has at its disposal a powerful means of applying pressure.

During the era that immediately followed World War II, the United States assumed control over the noncommunist world outside of Europe and the European countries had only to concern themselves with the borders they share with the Soviet Union. This is why a deplorable confusion was created between the notion of defense of Western Europe with arms and the more general notion of the security of that part of Europe in terms of trade with the outside world, trade on which it depends more and more, economically speaking. Dependent on the United States for their defense on European soil, the European countries have in general relied on the same United States to ensure the security of their supplies outside Europe, to its own advantage.

Since the Korean War in 1950-1953, this sytem has suffered its first defeat. According to UN statistics, this war produced nearly 6 million victims before it finally resulted in the initial dividing line. Then Southeast Asia went over to the communist camp, South Yemen was occupied by the Soviets, Moscow's influence was extended to Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia and Iran escaped from American influence. In short, between 1940 and 1980 the Soviets succeeded in annexing nearly 3 million square kilometers of territory contiguous to their country while they exercised their political and social (and also economic) influence over the inhabitants of another 4 million square kilometers.

Thus during this period a large part of those lands which the European countries are more or less dependent on for the functioning of their economies were swallowed up by the Soviet Union.

We must admit that through its behavior the West as a whole did nothing to put a stop to this form of expansion, even involuntarily favoring it, and in connection with this the example of its attitude toward South Africa is rather eloquent.

Today, the balance sheet of this confusion between security and defense by means of the arms of the Western nations is more negative than positive. The United States has imposed on its European allies a defense system which the development of weaponry, particularly through the impact of the United States itself, has rendered illusory since, with a slight lag, the Soviets are advancing in the same direction. With the aid of millions of men and by spending billions, we have in Europe set up a watch which is proving itself to be more and more ridiculous because of the growing vulnerability of a military disposition that we worked out some 30 years ago and which has hardly evolved since then. At the same time, we are losing ground everywhere, or almost so, outside of Europe. With the result that one day we may find ourselves facing a pile of weapons and a defense concept that have been made obsolete by technical advances, whereas abroad, economically and industrially, asphyxia stalks us with the formidable political and social consequences of the economic depression that may result from this situation. Then too, the United States could be completely mistaken in its strategy, both in the political domain and that of arms. And we fear that it may already be too late to correct the consequences of such an error.

General Thiry: Today, the West's policy of deterrence is limping for organizational, political and material reasons. We must, however, talk of the battle only in terms of deterrence. We do not want to fight a nuclear war that would end in catastrophe. The failure of the deterrence policy would lead to such a catastrophe. We must, therefore, do everything we can to see to it that deterrence does not fail, today and tomorrow.

D. SS-20 and Euromissiles

Listener Opinions

[Listener 1] Would not France's real contribution to the defense of Europe be to provide a response to the SS-20 rather than investing our small reserve in an affair the outcome of which would appear to be doubtful?

[Listener 2] There has been talk of the Soviet threat and the way in which this threat has increased thanks to the SS-20's. The theater-scale nuclear forces proposed by the United States are the response to these SS-20's. It seems, however, that for several weeks there has been a lot less talk of short-range theater-scale nuclear weapons and the SS-20, but much more talk of an advance in the overall NATO strategy or the American strategy. How are we involved in this problem of theater-scale nuclear forces and the proposals made by the Americans?

Speaker Replies

General Valentin: I do not believe that there is a response to the SS-20, if only because of the dissymmetry General Gallois has spoken of. However, these weapons subject us to political pressure. It is, therefore, politically prudent to offset the SS-20's with the Pershings if the Americans feel it to be necessary. As far as we are concerned, we have always put SS-20-type arms into the category of strategic nuclear weapons. In proposing a mobile anti-city missile launched from the ground, we are proposing a solution that offers possibilities in addition to those offered by submarine [launched missiles]. From the standpoint of price, a 100-missile SX cluster would be equivalent to about two submarines and would cost less to maintain. It is a matter of choice. Some think it would be better to have two more submarines and others the SX and the submarines. I quite agree with those who say that we need more submarines.

General Gallois: With regard to those weapons referred to as Eurostrategic — which include the Soviet SS-20, 21, 22, etc, as well as those missiles the Americans are still deploying in Europe (Lance, Pershing I) — we must emphasize the asymmetry of the strategic situations between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. During a radio interview, Mr Couve de Murville referred to the Afghanistan affair rather as an episode in order to grant priority to a "balance" of the military forces confronting one another in Europe. The restoration of just such a "balance" is a concern that has often been reaffirmed by Western statesmen. Militarily, we cannot speak of a "balance" between the armaments of societies as different from each other as those opposing one another on both sides of the iron curtain. Once it is possible for one of these, ours, to suffer the effects of an attack perpetrated by the other, neither their respective armaments, nor policies governing their use, nor deployments, nor alerts can be compared. Neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. For fear of having to suffer the effects of a surprise attack, permanent mobility has been imposed on the West. The same is not true of the East.

And then too, the geographical, political and social conditions are just too different. The deployment of Pershing II's in the West can only be justified by claiming that they would "offset" the SS-20's. The latter can be moved about in vast, almost empty areas without any risk of local opposition. This is not the case in Western Europe, a high-density area in terms of occupied land, where protesters could become numerous and active. If the nuclear warheads of these Pershing II's are not moved with their launchers, instead being stored in depots, they would be the first targets of a surprise attack of the kind foreseen above. The opportunity for the East to assume the initiative, the nature of our land and the freedom of action the citizens who live on it enjoy simultaneously conspire against us. As far as this situation is concerned, there is no symmetry between the parties involved.

Politically and, in terms of public opinion, psychologically, the deployment of Pershing II's — and "cruise missiles" if need be — in Western Europe is of some interest. This new deployment of arms is an indication of a desire for "reinvolvement" on the soil of the old continent and it eliminates the danger of "decoupling" which Western Europeans rightly fear. In addition, these new weapons will not be placed under the control of a "double key," but will depend for their use solely on the decision of the U.S. Government. This means that, guarded and operated by American troops, their destruction would involve the lives of those who maintain them and could unleash a reaction on the other side of the Atlantic that the opposing side would do well to avoid provoking. Consequently, these weapons constitute a natural deterrent, but only if the number of troops in the American units that operate them is large enough. U.S. response to the new threat that the SS-20's — and similar missiles, much more accurate than the SS-4's and SS-5's — now pose to conventional deployment of NATO forces is, therefore, endowed with a political character as well as a certain deterrent value.

At the end of the debate, a participant noted that it would be desirable to establish two points that do not involve mere terminology.

First point: We are quick to say that we do not belong to NATO. Actually, while we withdrew from the integrated military organization, as General de Gaulle wanted it to be, we have continued to participate in NATO activities. Thus we have not stopped contributing to the budget of the NATO Secretariat General in Brussels on the same basis as the other NATO countries, in accordance with an assessment rate based on national income.

Second point: We must translate "flexible response" as "adapted" or "graduated response." In the American sense, this means that the counterthrust must be adapted to the level of attack, the level of violence it represents, that is, the scale must be gradual and controlled. Since Mr Schlesinger's time, it has been made explicit — and the recently issued Directive 59 confirms the fact — that this does not exclude — quite the contrary — commitment of American central system arms at a relatively early stage of the conflict. These would involve limited strikes against military objectives behind the battlefield, not necessarily aimed at Soviet territory. The scaling of the counterthrust would, therefore, have to do with the extent and nature of the destruction desired, not with the nature of the weapons employed for that purpose. We maintain that this ability to commit so-called strategic weapons for purposes directly involving the battle in Europe is particularly important in terms of the assumption that we can launch a strike "that would disarm"

the SS-20's over the entire allied military disposition on our continent.

Naturally, it is possible for us to contest this belief just as it is to look for a better one. And, of course, this would not be ours. But we must refrain from gratuitously accusing our American friends because of their determination to defend Europe against any attack. Such an attitude would not only be possible without justification, but dangerous, just as anything is that contributes to damaging the credibility of the deterrent system and the NATO defense. We are well aware that the overall security of Europe rests on uncertainties, but such is the harsh law of the nuclear age.

Battle in Europe: Question Mark

Conclusions

As our readers have determined from the foregoing pages, the opinions voiced by the highly-placed persons who were so kind as to accept our invitation to enliven our debate have been extremely rich in original ideas and, on the other hand, the opinions of our guests, who came to listen to them in large numbers, have noticeably enriched the discussion, which was very lively but kept perfectly within bounds.

These observations do not, however, mean that we are now ready to decisively answer the question we posed: "Battle in Europe: question mark."

Actually, in our opinion this question mark did not have to do solely with the advisability of anticipating such a battle and the possible consequences of accepting the possibility that it could occur. It also had to do with the conditions that may reasonably be imagined for its execution from the standpoint of the military technique which we had decided to assign priority to in our proposal. In short, our question mark also had to do with the where, why and how of the participation of our maneuvering force in a possible military confrontation in Europe, and on this issue we were left rather unsatisfied, but no doubt because it is too sensitive.

We will therefore not comment on this aspect of our concerns but will limit ourselves here to offering a list of some general ideas that seem to us to have come out of our debate:

1. Dissociating the defense of France from that of Europe would not be realistic or would imply a complete reversal of our policy.

2. Solidarity of attitude and behavior is more deterrent than integration.

3. The notion of autonomy of decision is more concrete than that of independence.

4. Multiplicity of poles of decision strengthens deterrence by multiplying uncertainties.

5. It is best to leave the greatest possible number of choices open in order to maintain for as long as possible the chief of state's freedom of decision.

6. While it is dangerous to create deadlocks, a country like ours cannot simultaneously provide itself with all the means to deal with all imaginable situations. Therefore, the choices to be made involve priorities.

7. Nuclear deterrence at the strategic level is still our last resort. It would be dangerous to give up this concept, which would be a rejection of the logic of warfare.

8. The knowledge that we have at our disposal a good defense policy must not lead us into intellectual inertia. It, therefore, behooves us to constantly update our ideas.

9. In the end, what matters is the determination to defend ourselves.

But to avoid ending with these general ideas, which, moreover, stem more from common sense than anything else, in conclusion we take the liberty of quoting statements made by an eminent individual who greatly honored us by attending our meeting. In fact, General Boissieu was kind enough to take the floor at the end of our debate to sum up its philosophy in a few words. The grand chancellor of the Legion of Honor ended his talk by relating this very meaningful anecdote.

"When General de Gaulle heard that I was going to become chief of staff of the Army, he said to me: 'Your program is all laid out.' He probably thought that I was going to reply: 'My first job will be to replace all our armored equipment,' since it had begun to become seriously obsolete. But I didn't make that mistake. I said to him: 'I believe that my most urgent task will be to get the Plutos built.' Then he replied: 'Precisely, and I hope that your Air Force colleague will get the FATAC [Air Tactical Force] into operation in conjunction with tactical nuclear equipment as soon as possible, since in that way the combined force of the First Army and FATAC could in turn participate in France's general deterrence program."

We could not hope for a conclusion that better corresponds to our concerns.

FOOTNOTES

1. Edited by Major General S.N. Kozlov and a group of officers.

2. Published by Col Vasiliy Savkin of the Frounze Military Academy.

3. Colonel A.H. Sidorenko, "The Offensive." Colonel Sidorenko was a professor at the Frounze Academy.

4. "Soviet Military Strategy."

5. "Military Thinking."

6. Article by Army General M. Shtemenko.

7. Editor's note: According to "Military Balance 1980-1981," France will spend 3.9 percent of its GNP on defense, as against 3.3 percent for the FRG. Great Britain, whose GNP is a third less than France's, will devote 4.9 percent of it to defense.

8. Editor's note: France has five missile-launching nuclear submarines in service plus one under construction. The British only have four.

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BRIEFS

'CLEMENCEAU' FIRST--The aircraft carrier 'Clemenceau' has just finished taking part for several weeks in a massive national naval exercise with the principal ships of the Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets. The Super-Etendard aircraft on the 'Clemenceau' were capable, for the first time, of carrying tactical nuclear weapons. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 30 Mar 81 p 47]

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